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Pietro Gori 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores Nietzsche’s observations 
on language in Human, All Too Human I, 11; reflects on 
the anti-realist position that Nietzsche defends in that 
aphorism; and focuses on the role she plays in his later 
investigation on Western culture and its anthropology. As 
will be argued, Nietzsche’s criticism towards common 
sense realism is consistent with some pragmatist episte-
mologies developed during the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century. This treat of “timeliness” does not limit 
Nietzsche’s originality on the topic. In fact, the idea that 
philosophy can contrast the metaphysical commitment of 
common sense can be seen as the theoretical tool that al-
lows Nietzsche to operate on the development of Euro-
pean culture and society. 
 
Keywords: anti-realism; language; metaphysics; pragma-
tism 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to explore Nietzsche’s observations on 
language in Human, All Too Human I, 11, and to reflect 
on the cultural function Nietzsche attributes to that 
fundamental human device. Particular attention will be 
given to the anti-realism that Nietzsche defends in that 
aphorism, for that position plays an important role in his 
later investigation on Western culture and its anthropol-
ogy. The research will therefore not be limited to a thor-
ough investigation of HH I, 11;1 on the contrary, attention 
will be given to Nietzsche’s dealing with the conse-
quences of men’s belief in language in his later writings. 
As will be shown, according to him, the impact of lan-
guage on human culture is much deeper and philosophi-
cally relevant than what is described in Human, All Too 
Human, and involves Nietzsche’s arguments on morality 
and the degenerative anthropology he elaborates in par-
ticular during his late years.  
 Moreover, Nietzsche’s criticism towards common 
sense realism can be contextualized in the epistemological 
debate of his time, thus showing particular treats of “time-
liness.” This is something that needs to be clarified by 
some preliminary remarks, for in what follows (see sec-
tion 3) that epistemological debate will be addressed by 
talking of “pragmatism”. In this paper, pragmatism has to 
be understood in a broad sense, far from the contempo-
rary interpretations and applications that only share some 
basic principles with the original position developed by 
Peirce, James and Dewey. The attempt is therefore to go 
back to the time when pragmatism is born, and to look at 
it from a historical point of view. This perspective reveals 
a more complex – and less analytical – image of that 
view, and shows important connections between pragma-
tism and other anti-metaphysical positions grounded in 
the same roots as its own. 
 According to the subtitle of James’s book from 1907 – 
Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Think-
ing – pragmatism can be conceived as a research program 
that elaborates and develops some features of the late 
ninteenth-century philosophic and scientific thought, fea-
tures that this research program shares with other posi-
tions which arose in the same period. Common denomina-
tor of all these views is an epistemology rooted in evolu-
tionism (especially Darwinian evolutionism) and in some 
modern developments of Kantianism2. If considered from 
that perspective, pragmatism shows its complexity, and it 
is possible to evaluate its philosophical value by looking 
at the “diagnostic moment” that pertains to it and that 
comes before the methodology for evaluating truth to 
which pragmatism is usually reduced. In other words, 
pragmatism can be interpreted as a general strategy for 
dealing with the meaningless of the traditional notion of 
truth revealed by modern science and philosophy, and not 
just as a method for solving that problem.  
 The starting point of pragmatism is, according to 
James, the rejection of the old correspondence theory of 
truth, that is, of the metaphysical conception of truth that 
follows from the ordinary worldview and which is im-
plied in the language man daily uses – the same position 
that Nietzsche criticizes in Human, All Too Human and 
other writings3. One fundamental aim of pragmatism is 
therefore to criticise the “naïf realism” of common sense 
by means of philosophical and scientific thought. This 
aim does not pertain only to James’s investigation; rather, 
it can be found in other studies in epistemology carried on 
during the late nineteenth century, and in particular in the 
works of Ernst Mach and Hans Vaihinger4. Both these 
authors, without having been influenced by James (or 
other pragmatists), reflect on the realism of the common 
sense, and contrast that view with an anti-metaphysical 
conception of ideas and truths that stresses their purely 
relative role of human devices5. This attitude toward the 
common sense worldview can in fact be considered the 
point on which James’s, Mach’s and Vaihinger’s posi-
tions intersect, and therefore the very root of their being 
“pragmatist” epistemologies. As will be argued, Nietz-
sche can also be included in that list, for his anti-realist 
critique of language is in agreement with the above men-
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tioned views. Moreover, that critique becomes in Nietz-
sche a cultural strategy. Indeed, the idea that the philo-
sophical thought can criticize the metaphysical commit-
ment of common sense is one of Nietzsche’s fundamental 
theoretical tool that will allow him to operate on the de-
velopment of European culture and society – and, conse-
quently, on the human type they generate. 
 
 
2. Language and culture 
 
The eleventh paragraph of the first book of Human, All 
Too Human plays an important role in Nietzsche’s writ-
ing, for in that text one finds stated for the first time the 
idea that “mankind set up in language a separate [eigene] 
world beside the other [andere] world” – an idea that, as 
known, Nietzsche will be particularly concerned with dur-
ing his late period, when he talks about the distinction be-
tween “true” and “apparent” world. Moreover, in HH I, 
11, Nietzsche argues that “the significance of language 
for the evolution of culture [Cultur] lies” in the creation 
of this dualism, since that makes it possible for mankind 
to “make itself master of” the world. In this paper, atten-
tion will be payed to the anti-realism that Nietzsche de-
fends in that paragraph, that is, to his criticism towards 
the common sense view according to which our language 
is a truthful description of reality6. As Nietzsche puts it, 
 
to the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts 
and names of things as in aeternae veritates he has appropriated 
to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the ani-
mal: he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge 
of the world. The sculptor of language was not so modest as to 
believe that he was only giving things designations, he con-
ceived rather that with words he was expressing supreme know-
ledge of things; language is, in fact, the first stage of the occupa-
tion with science. Here, too, it is the belief that the truth has 
been found out of which the mightiest sources of energy have 
flowed. A great deal later – only now – it dawns on men that in 
their belief in language they have propagated a tremendous er-
ror. (HH I, 11) 
 
 In this excerpt, Nietzsche contrasts the idea that “in 
language [man] possesse[s] knowledge of the world” with 
an anti-realist and nominalist view. That idea is quite use-
ful, according to Nietzsche, for it played a fundamental 
role in the development of the human species by letting 
mankind raise itself above the animal. However, useful-
ness is not truthfulness, and the mere belief in something 
does not give to that something actuality. Therefore, one 
should be “modest”, and admit that concepts and names 
are only designations of things and that with words one 
does not “express supreme knowledge of things”.  
 This observation allows us to reflect on the cultural 
significance that Nietzsche attributes to language, which 
is in fact twofold. At the beginning of the above quoted 
passage, Nietzsche stresses a positive cultural significance 
of language, that is, its having made the world manage-
able for mankind, thus helping the preservation of the 
human species. But if one reads HH I, 11 in the light of 
Nietzsche’s later writing, it is possible to argue that lan-
guage also has a negative cultural significance for the 
human being. Indeed, the belief in the dichotomy between 
a “true” and an “apparent” world generates a degenerative 
anthropology. In Nietzsche’s view, the declining type of 
life he talks about after 1885, and the culture that type of 
life represents, are actually grounded on the “error” ac-
cording to which one mistakes names for reality of 
things7. It is worth noting that, in the same paragraph 
from Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche suggests that 
modern times are ready for a “new beginning”. As he ar-
gues – with all likelihood inspired by some post-Kantian 
thinkers – at his time it finally “dawn[ed] on men that in 
their belief in language they have propagated a tremen-
dous error” and, therefore, philosophy can reveal the 
fundamental mistake of common sense realism8. On that 
basis, it is possible to stress the importance of Nietzsche’s 
anti-realism for the development of human culture and 
society. That position is in fact the device that can be ad-
opted in order to educate mankind to a new worldview, 
thus opening the way for the development of an anti-
metaphysical culture. 
 If one looks at Nietzsche’s concerning with realism 
and nominalism throughout his writing, it is possible to 
see that these topics actually lead to the problem of cul-
ture. The anti-realistic attitude that Nietzsche defends in 
HH I, 11 is reiterated a few years later, in The Gay Sci-
ence. In the opening sections of the second book of that 
work, Nietzsche argues against the “realists” who “in-
sinuate that the world really is the way it appears” to 
them: “That mountain over there! That cloud over there! 
What is ‘real’ about that? Subtract just once the phantasm 
and the whole human contribution from it, you sober 
ones! Yes, if you could do that! (…) There is no ‘reality’ 
for us – and not for you either, you sober ones” (GS 57). 
Then, in the following paragraph, Nietzsche defends a 
sort of axiological nominalism by stating that, especially 
when we talk of value judgements, “what things are 
called is unspeakably more important than what they are” 
(GS 58). As he did in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche 
is concerned with the role that words – which, according 
to him, are mere human designations – play in ordinary 
thought, and tries to shake the traditional belief in their 
value as truthful representation of the world. 
 That view is developed in Beyond Good and Evil 268, 
where Nietzsche states that “words are acoustic signs for 
concepts; concepts, though, are more or less determinate 
pictorial signs for sensations that occur together and recur 
frequently, for groups of sensations”. This idea comes 
from the book of the post-Kantian thinker Gustav Teich-
müller, Die Wirkliche und die Scheinbare Welt (1882), 
that Nietzsche read after 1883 and that strongly influ-
enced his late thought9. What is worth noting, for the aims 
of the present paper, is that the main topic of BGE 268 is 
culture and communication. Nietzsche’s dealing with the 
mere symbolic value of words is thus aimed at showing 
that in our language we do not have a truthful knowledge 
of things. On the contrary, the language we speak is only 
a translation and interpretation of reality, and we can 
properly understand each other only if we share a com-
plex background, the several features of which shape the 
words we use. Moreover, in BGE 268 Nietzsche antici-
pates some observations that he later publishes in The 
Gay Science 354. As known, this paragraph is devoted to 
the role of consciousness for the sake of communication, 
and Nietzsche argues that “the word of which we can be-
come conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world” and 
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that “all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough 
corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generali-
zation”. Moreover, in GS 354 Nietzsche stresses that the 
world-image our consciousness draws is shaped by the 
perspective of the human-herd, a topic that involves ques-
tions related to Christian morality and, therefore, Euro-
pean culture10.  
 The final step of this very brief and partial exposition 
is Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols. In the third section of 
that text, “Reason” in Philosophy – a section where 
Nietzsche develops several ideas already published in 
Human, All Too Human, I – one reads: 
 
These days we see ourselves mired in error, drawn necessarily 
into error, precisely to the extent that the prejudice of reason 
forces us to make use of unity, identity, permanence, substance, 
cause, objectification, being; we have checked this through rig-
orously and are sure that this is where the error lies. This is no 
different than the movement of the sun, where our eye is a con-
stant advocate for error, here it is language. Language began at a 
time when psychology was in its most rudimentary form: we 
enter in a crudely fetishistic mindset when we call into con-
sciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of lan-
guage – in the vernacular: the presuppositions of reason. (GD, 
“Reason” 5) 
 
 In this passage, Nietzsche develops what he first ar-
gued in HH I, 11. His fundamental idea is that our lan-
guage is the very source of the common sense realism we 
traditionally adopt, that is, a worldview that believes in 
the existence of substances, identical things, and other 
“presuppositions with which nothing in the real world 
corresponds” (HH I, 11). Insofar as they outline a meta-
physical world and force us to believe that this world is 
the “true” one, the prejudices of reason are at the origin of 
the anthropological degeneration of the human being that 
in Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche particularly deals with 
(in that text he calls it décadence). Thus, in this book 
from 1888 one finds the final development of a reflection 
started in 1878, and Nietzsche shows to his readers the 
effects of language on the human being. As above argued, 
language has an important – but negative – cultural sig-
nificance, for the (theoretical) division of the world in two 
separate realms it presupposes deeply impacts on our 
society and on the individual himself, finally producing a 
declined type of man11. Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols 
is explicitly aimed at contrasting that consequence, by 
means of a critique of the value of the “eternal idols” – 
which are in fact the old truths traditionally adopted (see 
EH, Twilight of the Idols 1).  
 
 
3. Scientific thought and common sense realism 
 
The reflection on the metaphysical implications of lan-
guage and the importance of a philosophical critique of 
common sense characterizes the early pragmatist episte-
mology. In a paper from one of the founders of the Meta-
physical Club, Chauncey Wright, it is possible to find 
some interesting remarks on language, which sound quite 
similar to those published by Nietzsche in Human, All 
Too Human: 
 
The languages employed by philosophers are themselves lessons 
in ontology, and have, in their grammatical structures, implied 
conceptions and beliefs common to the philosopher and to the 
barbarian inventors of language, as well as other implications 
which he takes pains to avoid. How much besides he ought to 
avoid, in the correction of conceptions erroneously taken from 
the forms of language, is a question always important to be con-
sidered in metaphysical inquiries. (Wright, 1873: 280) 
 
Wright’s paper has been published in 1873, and with all 
likelihood Nietzsche did not read it. Nevertheless, it 
shows us that, when Nietzsche developed his early philo-
sophical investigations (the unpublished writing On Truth 
and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, which deals with the 
metaphorical value of language, is dated 1873), other 
thinkers were concerned with the metaphysical implica-
tions of our language. Moreover, as Wright’s paper sug-
gests, the question these thinkers were facing was how to 
deal with that ontology, that is, which should be the role 
of philosophy in the “correction of conceptions erro-
neously taken from the forms of language” and that con-
stitute the content of the ordinary worldview? 
 This question has been addressed by William James in 
one of the lectures collected in his Pragmatism (1907) 
and titled Pragmatism and Common Sense. The starting 
point of James is an evolutionary conception of know-
ledge which can be compared with that defended by 
Nietzsche (e.g. in GS 110). According to James,  
 
our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries 
of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to pre-
serve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent 
time. They form one great stage of equilibrium in the human 
mind’s development, the stage of common sense. (James, 1907: 
170) 
 
According to James, common sense makes use of certain 
intellectual forms or categories of reason, such as 
“things”, “kinds”, “bodies”, “causal influence”, etc., 
which are purely logical concepts that proved their use-
fulness in the history of our species, but whose actual re-
ality cannot be demonstrated12. According to him, “com-
mon sense appears as a perfectly definite stage in our 
understanding of things, a stage that satisfies in an extra-
ordinarily successful way the purposes for which we 
think”, and “suffices for all the necessary practical ends 
of life” (James, 1907: pp. 181-182). Given this practical 
usefulness, the ordinary worldview cannot be rejected, but 
it would be necessary to reflect on the metaphysical 
commitment it involves. What interests James is actually 
to stress the nature and origin of the notions we daily use, 
for modern science, at her stage of development, cannot 
accept the old conception of knowledge (and truth) any-
more. 
 In dealing with the character of concepts, James re-
veals his other main reference, that is, the German school 
of Post- and Neo-Kantian thinkers: “All our conceptions – 
argues James – are what the Germans call Denkmittel, 
means by which we handle facts by thinking them” 
(James, 1907: pp. 171-172). Moreover, he states that 
 
in practice, the common-sense Denkmittel are uniformly victori-
ous. Everyone, however instructed, still thinks of a “thing” in 
the common-sense way, as a permanent unit-subject that “sup-
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ports” its attributes interchangeably. No one stably or sincerely 
uses the more critical notion, of a group of sense-qualities united 
by a law. (James, 1907: pp. 180-181) 
 
This excerpt reminds what Nietzsche states in Beyond 
Good and Evil 268, when he talks of words as “acoustic 
signs for concepts”, and of concepts as “signs (…) for 
groups of sensations”. Modern epistemology actually re-
flected on the nature of our knowledge, and stressed the 
purely logical value of words and concepts. Both of them, 
indeed, are a secondary product of our intellect, which 
provide man with means for finding his way in the world. 
The problem at stake, here, is not only epistemological, 
but also ontological. In dealing with the relationship be-
tween ordinary and critical thinking, two different – and 
apparently contrasting – metaphysical conceptions are in-
deed taken into account. As one reads in the above quoted 
passage, James is well aware of the impossibility of get-
ting rid of the language traditionally adopted, but he also 
thinks that the metaphysics implied in that language 
should be rejected. In James’s view, a critical approach 
can help superseding “the naif conception of things (…), 
and a thing’s name [can be] interpreted as denoting only 
the law or Regel der Verbindung by which certain of our 
sensations habitually succeed or coexist”. Thus, con-
cludes James, “science and critical philosophy burst the 
bounds of common sense. With science naif realism 
ceases” (James, 1907: pp. 185-186). 
 James’s observations on that topic – in particular, his 
talking of concepts as names for “groups of sense-
qualities” and his idea that science can correct the realism 
defended by the common sense – have been inspired by 
the work of the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach. At the end 
of the first chapter of The Analysis of Sensations (19002) – 
a book that James carefully read13 – Mach argues: 
 
The philosophical point of view of the average man – if that 
term may be applied to his naïve realism – has a claim to the 
highest consideration. It has arisen in the process of immeasur-
able time without the intentional assistance of man. It is a pro-
duct of nature, and is preserved by nature. (…) The fact is, every 
thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced to abandon 
his one-sided intellectual occupation by practical necessity, im-
mediate returns to the general point of view of mankind. (…) 
Nor is the purpose of these “introductory remarks” to discredit 
the standpoint of the plain man. The task which we have set our-
selves is simply to show why and for what purpose we hold that 
standpoint during most of our lives, and why and for what pur-
pose we are provisionally obliged to abandon it. No point of 
view has absolute, permanent validity. Each has importance 
only for some given end. (Mach, 1914: p. 37) 
 
 These observations come at the end of some introduc-
tory antimetaphysical remarks aimed at showing the 
merely theoretical character of the distinction between the 
realms of the physical and the psychical. According to 
Mach’s neutral-monist view, reality is constituted by 
“elements” that we first perceive and therefore group in 
relatively permanent complexes. It is only at this stage 
that we interpret these complexes of elements as either 
physical or psychical events, depending on the functional 
relation they are part of, and on our research interests in 
that particular moment14. Moreover, Mach stresses the 
purely fictional value of substance-concepts such as “ego” 
or “body”: both of them are only mental constructs, 
thought symbols elaborated for practical purposes15. In 
the same way as James, Mach therefore contrasts the 
common sense – naif – metaphysical realism, which pre-
tends that ego, body, and things actually exist, with a sci-
entific and critical standpoint. Nevertheless, Mach also 
recognizes the practical value of the point of view of the 
average man – a point of view which proved its import-
ance for the preservation of the species – and admits that, 
for daily use, that perspective cannot be abandoned. The 
question is, thus, to what extent scientific thought can cor-
rect the common sense view. 
 Mach dealt with that question some years later, in 
Knowledge and Error (1905). In that book, Mach argues 
that everyone accepts “as a gift of nature and culture 
[Kultur]” a worldview that is intrinsically metaphysical, 
insofar as she believes in bodies and souls as substance 
entities. That is the starting point of any world-
description; “no thinker can do more than start from this 
view, extend and correct it, use his forebears’ experience 
and avoid their mistakes as best he may, in short: care-
fully to tread the same path again on his own” (Mach, 
1976: p. 4). In Mach’s view, the history of civilization 
and culture is the history of the relationship between ordi-
nary and scientific thought (the latter including both phi-
losophy and specialist research)16. Ordinary thought, “at 
least in its beginnings, serves practical ends, and first of 
all the satisfaction of bodily needs; it “does not serve pure 
knowledge, and therefore suffers from various defects 
that at first survive in scientific thought, which is derived 
from it. Science only very gradually shakes itself free 
from these flaws”; finally, “any glance at the past will 
show that progress in scientific thought consists in con-
stant correction of ordinary thought” (Mach, 1976: p. 2).  
 The correction Mach talks about is in fact a critical 
view of the realism defended by common sense. Scientific 
thought actually provides a more accurate world-
description which gradually gets rid of all the metaphysi-
cal notions inherited from the past conceptions. What is 
worth noting, for the aim of the present paper, is that 
Mach focuses on the same features of the ordinary world-
view Nietzsche stresses in HH I, 11. According to Mach, 
indeed, scientific thought can particularly shed light on 
the artificial contraposition between illusion (Schein) and 
reality (Wahrheit): it is only the “confusion between find-
ings under the most various conditions with findings 
under very definite and specific conditions” that “in ordi-
nary thought leads to the opposition between illusion and 
reality, between appearance and object. (…) Once this 
opposition has emerged, it tends to invade philosophy as 
well, and is not easily dislodged” (Mach, 1976: p. 7. See 
also Mach, 1914: pp. 10 ff.). The problem Mach faces is 
therefore the same that interested Nietzsche from his early 
stage of thought. Our language and the culture it repre-
sents generate a metaphysical word description, according 
to which one can distinguish between appearances and 
things-in-themselves, as if they pertain to two different 
and separated realms. Actually, that distinction is only an 
illusory product of our view of the world, which is 
physiologically limited by our cognitive and perceiving 
apparatus. Furthermore, in Mach’s view, all the substance 
concepts that ordinary thought pretend to be isolated ob-
jects, such as things, bodies and ego, have to be seen only 
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as mere names for groups of elements. As a critical inves-
tigation shows us, indeed, “they are only fictions for a 
preliminary enquiry, in which we consider strong and ob-
vious links but neglect weaker and less noticeable ones” 
(Mach, 1976: p. 9). 
 This fictionalist view of ego, bodies and things is an-
other link to Nietzsche’s investigation. In Twilight of the 
Idols, and more precisely in the sections “Reason” in 
Philosophy 5 and The Four Great Errors 6, Nietzsche 
criticizes the traditional belief in the I as both causal agent 
and substance concept17. Moreover, the topic of fictions is 
quite useful to introduce the last author that will be con-
sidered in this section, and whose approach to episte-
mology has something in common with pragmatism. The 
main work of Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As if” 
(1911) is an in-depth and exhaustive investigation of the 
concept of “fiction”, the basis of which Vaihinger pro-
grammatically aimed to lay out, as the subtitle of his main 
work suggests: “A system of the theoretical, practical and 
religious fictions of mankind”18. As summarized by Klaus 
Ceynowa (1993: p. 9), “The Philosophy of “As if” sup-
ports the thesis that we must not see scientific theories as 
representing outer reality, but only as instruments to man-
age it”. This thesis is particularly “grounded on the idea 
that the human intellect has a fundamental practical func-
tion”, since it creates a manageable world-image that 
helps human self-preservation. Vaihinger explicitly states 
that “knowledge is a secondary purpose, (…) the primary 
aim [of logical thinking] being the practical attainment of 
communication and action” (Vaihinger, 1925: p. 170). 
This is better argued in the opening page of the first part 
of The Philosophy of  'As if '”, where Vaihinger presents 
the basic principles of his view:  
 
The object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal 
of reality – this would be an utterly impossible task – but rather 
to provide us with an instrument for finding our way about more 
easily in this world. Subjective processes of thought (…) repre-
sent the highest and ultimate result of organic development, and 
the world of ideas is the fine flower of the whole cosmic pro-
cess; but for that very reason it is not a copy of it in the ordinary 
sense. (Vaihinger, 1925: p. 15) 
 
 It is easy to see that Vaihinger’s fictionalism is first 
contrasted with a correspondence theory of truth, that is, 
the idea that our knowledge is a copy of outer reality. In 
his (evolutionary) view, human knowledge is only the 
final product of a biological development and its value is 
merely instrumental. Moreover, Vaihinger holds that our 
mind is “assimilative and constructive”, and that “logical 
thought is an active appropriation of the outer world, a 
useful organic elaboration of the material sensation” 
(Vaihinger, 1925: p. 1)19. Thus, according to him, the 
“psyche” (to be understood not as a substance, but rather 
as “the organic whole of all so-called 'mental' actions and 
reactions”) is an organic formative force, which inde-
pendently changes what has been appropriated (Vai-
hinger, 1925: p. 2). Finally, Vaihinger considers scientific 
thought as a function of the psyche and calls “fictions” 
the products of its activity: “The fictive activity of the 
mind is an expression of the fundamental psychical for-
ces; fictions are mental structures” (Vaihinger, 1925: p. 
12). 
 This view is strongly influenced by Friedrich Lange’s 
History of Materialism20. In that book, Vaihinger found 
an exposition of the most important topics debated by 
German neo-Kantian thinkers and scientists during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. In particular, Lange 
made reference to the studies of the German physiologist 
Johannes Müller and focused on the epistemological 
value of sense organs21. As for Lange, “pure” knowledge 
is not possible; anything we know is first moulded by our 
sense organs, and therefore by our intellect and its logical 
structure. This is coherent with the development of Kant’s 
epistemology that Lange aimed to provide and whose 
radicalization led to Vaihinger’s philosophical position22. 
In Vaihinger’s view, his own fictionalism – that is, the 
idea that “psychical constructs (…) are only fictions, i.e. 
conceptual and ideational aids”, and “not hypotheses re-
lating to the nature of reality” – is in fact a “'critical' 
standpoint” (Vaihinger, 1925: p. 177). 
 This brief outline of the content of Vaihinger’s book 
already shows the several similarities between his view 
and those of James, Mach – and Nietzsche. Vaihinger re-
acts to the same outcomes of modern epistemology that 
James and Mach have in mind when they develop their 
own epistemological views. The relativization of the 
value of human knowledge requires a new conception of 
truth and ideas, a conception that can give them the mean-
ing they lost. Vaihinger, in agreement with other pragma-
tist thinkers, stresses the practical usefulness of concepts, 
but at the same times insists on their metaphysical lack of 
content. Theories, ideas, etc., are, in his view, only con-
ceptual constructs that played a fundamental role in the 
development of the species, but whose value must be re-
stricted to their operational fruitfulness. This idea can of 
course be compared with Nietzsche’s view. The latter, 
indeed, also claims that the categories of reason have only 
a pure logical value, and stresses the role of these catego-
ries as tools for the preservation of the species. Moreover, 
similarities with Nietzsche’s view can be found with re-
gards to Vaihinger’s idea that primary aim of the logical 
activity is communication. In dealing with that topic, 
Vaihinger talks of sensation-complexes that can only be 
managed – and, therefore, communicated – if they are ex-
pressed in words, and argues that a common error is to 
regard “such logical instruments as ends in themselves 
and in ascribing to them an independent value for know-
ledge” (Vaihinger, 1925: pp. 168 and 170). This discourse 
is quite similar to the observations that one finds in Be-
yond Good and Evil 268, and the anti-metaphysical con-
ception that Vaihinger defends can be compared to what 
Nietzsche states in Human, All Too Human I, 1123. In 
general, all the above considered authors agree in looking 
at philosophical and scientific thought as an instrument to 
shed light on the ordinary worldview and contrast the 
realism that view upholds with a critical standpoint that 
can help developing a new anti-metaphysical culture.  
 
 
4. Nietzsche’s timeliness 
 
From what above stated, it can be argued that the observa-
tions on language that Nietzsche publishes in 1878 are in 
agreement with the epistemologies developed by some 
PIETRO GORI 
 212 
authors that, in a broad sense, can be called “pragmatists”. 
At the core of Nietzsche’s original philosophical position 
one actually finds ideas debated during the late nineteenth 
century, and that apparently inspired Nietzsche24. Thus, it 
is possible to say that, in dealing with language and the 
metaphysical worldview of the average man, Nietzsche is 
a proper timely thinker.  
 Other passages from the first book of Human, All Too 
Human show that compliance. In HH I, 16, for example, 
Nietzsche defends an evolutionary conception of know-
ledge, and argues: “That which we now call the world is 
the outcome of a host of errors and fantasies which we 
have gradually arisen and grown entwined with one an-
other in the course of the overall evolution of the organic 
being, and are now inherited by us as the accumulated 
treasure of the entire past”. This sentence sounds quite 
similar to some above quoted passages from James, 
Mach, and particularly – because of the reference to the 
inherited “errors” – Vaihinger. Nietzsche repeats that 
view a few pages later, in HH I, 18, where he claims that 
“only knowledge educated in the highest scientificality 
contradicts (…) the belief that there are identical things”, 
an idea inherited “from the period of the lower organ-
isms”. Furthermore, in that same paragraph, Nietzsche 
defines metaphysics as “the science that treats of the 
fundamental errors of mankind – but does so as though 
they were fundamental truths”. These observations have a 
pure pragmatist taste. In criticizing the character of hu-
man knowledge, that, according to the evolutionary view, 
cannot be considered as corresponding to reality, Nietz-
sche agrees with one important principle of Jamesian 
epistemology. Moreover, the idea that ordinary thought 
upholds a metaphysical conception that pretends our intel-
lectual “errors” to be actual “truths”, leads to a proble-
matization of the value of truth and to the question of her 
actual meaning – which is the very ground of the investi-
gation of all pragmatist thinkers and can be found also at 
the core of Nietzsche’s mature thought25. 
 As final remark on Nietzsche’s early concerning with 
metaphysics, two other paragraphs from Human, All Too 
Human must be taken into account. HH I, 9 and 21, in-
deed, reveal an agnostic attitude to that topic that can be 
compared with James’s famous idea that pragmatism is 
not interested in the sterile and interminable disputes of 
the old philosophical schools, and rather aims at finding a 
method for evaluating ideas and theories that looks at the 
practical plane26. In the first of these paragraphs, Nietz-
sche considers the absolute possibility of the existence of 
a metaphysical world. That possibility, argues Nietzsche, 
“is hardly to be disputed. We behold all things through 
the human head and cannot cut off this head; while the 
question nonetheless remains what of the world would 
still be there if no one had cut it off” (HH I, 9). Nietz-
sche’s point of view on this topic is – exactly as James’s 
and his friend Ferdinand Schiller’s – quite a humanist 
perspective27: we are confined into our body and can only 
access to external reality through our perceptive and cog-
nitive apparatus. The world we know is the world our 
sense organs and intellect create, by selecting, interpreting 
and falsifying the external data. What can interest us, 
therefore, is only what we find within these boundaries, 
while everything lying beyond them is not our concern. 
Thus, Nietzsche argues that “even if the existence of such 
a [metaphysical] world were never so well demonstrated, 
it is certain that knowledge of it would be the most use-
less of all knowledge: more useless even than knowledge 
of the chemical composition of water must be to the sailor 
in danger of shipwreck” (HH I, 9).  
 Nietzsche deals with that problem in HH I, 21, and 
reflects in particular on the consequences of a sceptical 
point of departure for culture and society, a point of view 
that rejects the very idea of the existence of the “separate 
world” that “mankind set up in language” (HH I, 11). “If 
there were no other, metaphysical world and all explan-
ations of the only world known to us drawn from meta-
physics were useless to us – asks Nietzsche – in what 
light would we then regard man and things?” (HH I, 21). 
Then, he continues: 
 
The historical probability is that one day mankind will very pos-
sibly become in general and on the whole sceptical in this mat-
ter; thus the question becomes: what shape will human society 
then assume under the influence of such an attitude of mind? 
Perhaps the scientific demonstration of the existence of any kind 
of metaphysical world is already so difficult that mankind will 
never again be free of a mistrust of it. And if one has a mistrust 
of metaphysics the results are by and large the same as if it had 
been directly refuted and one no longer had the right to believe 
in it. (HH I, 21) 
 
 This excerpts clearly shows the cultural value that 
Nietzsche attributed to his own work. According to him, a 
critical attitude towards common sense realism and the 
metaphysics set up in language can actually get us rid of 
that illusory realm, thus providing a new attitude of mind 
to our society. Nietzsche’s philosophy is precisely aimed 
at that goal and, as above argued, in modern epistemology 
he found the theoretical tools that can shake the meta-
physical world from its basis and lead European culture to 
a new stage. 
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Notes 
 
1
 Nietzsche’s works are cited by abbreviation, chapter (when applicable) 
and section number. The abbreviations used are the following: HH (Hu-
man, All Too Human), GS (The Gay Science), BGE (Beyond Good and 
Evil), GM (On the Genealogy of Morality), TI (Twilight of the Idols), 
EH (Ecce Homo). The translations used are from the Cambridge Edition 
of Nietzsche’s works (see final references). 
2
 The study of Philip P. Wiener (1944) is still a good introduction to the 
relationship between pragmatism and evolutionism. On this, see also 
Franzese (2006). On the less studied connection between pragmatism 
and (Neo-)Kantianism, see Murphey (1968) and Ferrari (2010). 
3
 See on this James (1907: chapters 5 to 7).  
4
 Both these authors have actually been called pragmatists in some sense 
and for different reasons. On this, see Holton (1992) and Bouriau 
(2009). 
5
 On this, see what James states in The Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to 
“Pragmatism” (1909: 58). 
6 On this, see also Stack (1981: pp. 95 and 98). 
7
 The topic of “errors” in Nietzsche has a strong evolutionary meaning. 
See on this e.g. HH I, 16; GS 110 and 111. 
8
 As known, during the 1870s Nietzsche has been particularly influenced 
by F. Lange’s Geschichte des Materialismus (Iserlohn, Baedeker, 
1875
2
), K. Fischer’s Geschichte der neuern Philosophie (6 vols., 
Stuttgart-Mannheim-Heidelberg, 1854–77), and A. Spir’s Denken und 
Wirklichkeit (Leipzig, J. G. Findel, 1877). 
9
 See on this Riccardi (2014: 252-253). 
10 On this, see Gori (2016: chapter 3). On the relationship between BGE 
268 and GS 354, see Lupo (2006: pp.196 ff.) and Gori (2016: pp. 119 
ff.). 
11
 It is worth noting that the whole section TI, “Reason” is influenced by 
Teichmüller’s book. Nietzsche’s arguing that our ordinary metaphysical 
 
 
commitment follows from our “faith in grammar” and of course his talk-
ing of a “true” and an “apparent” world, are particular evidences of that 
influence. 
12
 Nietzsche also stresses this point in HH I, 11 and GS 110. 
13
 On this, see Ryan (1989: pp. 45-55), and Holton (1992: pp. 35-36). 
Nietzsche bought the first edition of Mach’s book (Beiträge zur Analyse 
der Empfindungen, 1886), which is still in his private library. On the 
relationship between Nietzsche and Mach, see e.g. Gori (2009). 
14 See e.g. Mach (1914: p. 16). On Ernst Mach’s elements and his neu-
tral monism, see Banks (2003). 
15
 On Mach’s conception of the ego and a possible comparison with 
Nietzsche’s view of that topic, see Gori (2015).  
16
 On the relationship between philosophical and scientific thought, see 
Mach (1976: pp. 2 ff.). 
17 On this, see Gori (2015). 
18
 See Neuber (1914: p. 9). 
19
 Michael Heidelberger (2014: p. 53) directly compared Vaihinger’s 
view of human thought as a “biological function” with Ernst Mach’s 
epistemology. 
20
 As Vaihinger states (1925: p. XXXV), in Lange he found “a master, a 
guide, an ideal teacher”. Vaihinger particularly devotes to Lange’s 
“Standpoint of the Ideal” one section of the third part (Historical Con-
firmations) of his The Philosophy of “As-if.” On Lange’s influence on 
Vaihinger see Ceynowa (1993: chapter 3) and Heidelberger (2014). 
21
 See Ceynowa (1993: pp. 134 f.). 
22
 See Heidelberger (2014: pp. 51 ff.) and Vaihinger (1925:  p. XXXVI). 
23 It is worth noting that Vaihinger mentioned Nietzsche among the “his-
torical confirmations” of his own philosophical perspective. In the final 
section of his book (1925: p. 341), Vaihinger particularly stressed that 
Nietzsche recognized “that life and science are not possible without im-
aginary or false conceptions” and “that false ideas must be employed 
both in science and life by intellectually mature people and with the full 
realization of their falsity”. Finally, he argued that “it was Lange, in all 
likelihood, who in this case served as his guide”. Furthermore (1925: p. 
341-342), Vaihinger states that “Nietzsche, like Lange, emphasizes the 
great significance of “appearances” in all the various field of science and 
life”, and then claims that “this Kantian or, if you will, neo-Kantian ori-
gin of Nietzsche’s doctrine has hitherto been completely ignored”. 
24
 Of course, Nietzsche cannot have been directly inspired by James or 
Vaihinger, and there are also evidences of the fact that he knew Mach 
very late. What can be stated, however, is that Nietzsche reacted to the 
same cultural framework that James, Mach and Vaihinger made refer-
ence to, and that led these authors to develop comparable views on some 
particular issues. On the influence of the nineteenth-century scientific 
framework on Nietzsche, see e.g. Heit/Heller (2014). 
25
 See in particular GM III, 24 and 27, and Gori (2016)  
26
 See e.g. James (1907: chapter 2). 
27 See on this Schiller (1912) and Stack (1982). 
